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SYMPOSIUM




Although the current state of the United States Supreme Court's
Religion Clause' jurisprudence is an area of considerable complexity, 2
the Court's approach is largely premised upon a number of basic
underlying principles and doctrines. In 1971, the Court decided
Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 which delineated a three-part test for determin-
ing whether a law violates the Establishment Clause. 4 While the pre-
cise contours of the Lemon test have been subject to substantial
© 2009 SamuelJ. Levine. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University. I thank Rick Garnett, Rob Vischer,
and the Editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for working to organize this Symposium,
and I thank Kent Greenawalt for his pioneering scholarship and thoughtful guidance.
Finally, I thank Fraida Liba, Yehudah, Aryeh, and Rachel for continued
encouragement.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ").
2 For efforts of leading scholars to navigate the Court's Religion Clause jurispru-
dence, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER L. EISCRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007); NOAH FELDMAN, DVIDED BY GOD (2005); 1
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS
(2006) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE]; 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND
THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2007) [hereinafter GREENAWALT,
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS]; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008);
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE (1995).
3 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4 See id. at 612-13.
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refinement and modification, 5 the decision has not been overruled,
and it remains the starting point for the Court's rulings in this area.6
In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,7 the Court seemed to upset
settled free exercise law, in favor of a broad policy rejecting religious
challenges to neutral statutes of general applicability.8 The Court's
decision in Smith prompted considerable criticism,9 as well as subse-
quent legislation aimed at reversing and limiting its effect. 10 Never-
theless, the decision stands and, with some exceptions, represents the
current state of free exercise law.
This Symposium issue of the Notre Dame Law Review explores
another underlying principle of the Supreme Court's current Relig-
ion Clause jurisprudence, the Court's hands-off approach to questions
of religious practice and belief. The Symposium is based on the pro-
gram of the Law and Religion Section at the 2008 Annual Meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools, in which a panel of leading
scholars was asked to evaluate the Court's approach. The program
description invited a variety of modes of analysis, ranging from
descriptive considerations of the extent to which the Court's doctrine
can, indeed, be characterized as hands-off, to normative justifications
for-and critiques of-the Court's approach, to more practical and
consequentialist arguments supporting or opposing the Court's
position."
5 See Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Relig-
ion Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 323, 361-69; Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehn-
quist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 146 (2004); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is
Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993).
6 See GREENAWALT, FREE EXERCISE, supra note 2, at 33 ("[T]he use of [the Lemon]
test as such, has been waning, but its elements still help determine whether a state law
will be rejected.").
7 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
8 See id. at 878-82.
9 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
10-39 (arguing that deferral to facially neutral laws restricting religion creates a "legal
framework for persecution"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1990) (arguing that "Smith is contrary
to the deep logic of the First Amendment").
10 These include the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (1) to (2) (2000).
11 The AALS program description stated:
In recent years, a number of scholars have observed that the United
States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in
deciding matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and
belief. Justices have provided various rationales for the Court's approach.
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On a descriptive level, there is ample Supreme Court case law
supporting the proposition that the Court generally eschews decision-
making that requires adjudication of religious doctrine. 12 As a thresh-
Some Justices have suggested practical justifications for their reluctance to
examine closely religious beliefs, declaring that courts are "ill equipped" to
deal with such questions, which these Justices consider beyond judicial com-
petence. Other Justices have cited constitutional considerations to support
their view that courts should refrain from deciding questions of religious
interpretation.
In response, some have argued that courts should be more willing to
decide questions of religious interpretation, in particular when failure to do
so would prevent a meaningful resolution of a case. In fact, according to
some critics, as a result of the Court's increasing refusal to consider carefully
the religious questions central to many cases, the Court often tends to group
together religious claims and practices, regardless of the relative validity or
importance of a particular practice within a religious system. This approach
can have important and potentially negative ramifications for both Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Finally, the Court has not provided a definition of the term "religion,"
thereby refusing to interpret the very concept at the center of Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause cases.
This session will address these issues from [a] number of perspectives.
Descriptively, the session will consider the extent to which the Court has, in
fact, applied a "hands-off" approach to questions of religious practice and
belief. Normatively, the session will explore the arguments in favor of and
opposed to such an approach. Finally, the session will look at prospects for
rethinking some of the assumptions underlying the Court's attitudes, as well
as the possibility of proposing alternative methods.
See Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Program of 2008 AALS Annual Meeting, Section on Law
and Religion, http://www.aals.org/am2008/friday/index.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2008).
The panel consisted of paper presentations by four of the authors contributing
essays to this Symposium issue, Christopher Eisgruber, Richard Garnett, Andrew Kop-
pelman, and Bernadette Meyler, in addition to thoughtful commentary provided by
Kent Greenawalt, whose written response is included in this issue. The proceedings
were skillfully moderated by Robert Vischer. See id.
12 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458
(1988) (stating that interpreting the propriety of certain religious beliefs puts the
Court "in a role that [it was] never intended to play"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 257 (1982) (refusing to assess the "proper interpretation of the Amish faith");
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("[Rleligious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection."); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
721 (1976) (noting the "error" of "delv[ing] into ...church constitutional provi-
sions"); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969) (refusing to "engage in the forbidden process of interpret-
ing ... church doctrine"); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (avoiding
the "forbidden domain" of evaluating religious doctrine); see also Richard W. Garnett,
Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51
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old matter, as far back as 1944, the Court emphasized that it may not
determine the "truth or falsity" of a religious belief.13 More recently,
beginning in 1969, when faced with differing views of religious tenets,
the Court has refused to engage in "interpretation of particular
church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the relig-
ion,"' 4 and has stated plainly that "[clourts are not arbiters of scrip-
tural interpretation."'15
Notably, though, in some cases, aspects of the majority's hands-
off approach have faced objections leveled by a number of Justices in
concurring and dissenting opinions. 16 Moreover, the current itera-
tion of the Court's approach arguably represents the final product of
a process in which, over the course ofjust a few decades, the hands-off
UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1652-59 (2004) (providing an overview of the Court's "no relig-
ious decisions" jurisprudence); Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a "Religious Question" Doc-
trine?Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497,
497 (2005) ("[T] he Court has greatly expanded its.., prohibition [of assessing relig-
ious claims]."); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) ("The Supreme Court's basic
constitutional approach . . .is that secular courts must not determine questions of
religious doctrine and practice."); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's
Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief 25 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 85,
88 (1997) (" [I] n recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly avoided addressing
issues that require consideration of the nature of religious practice and belief.").
13 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
14 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450.
15 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
16 For example, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, one of the
landmark church property cases, Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority's
hands-off approach that "'a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of
church tribunals as it finds them."' 426 U.S. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing id. at 713 (majority opinion)). Joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Rehnquist
responded that:
[E]ven this rule requires that proof be made as to what these decisions are,
and if proofs on that issue conflict the civil court will inevitably have to
choose one over the other. In so choosing, if the choice is to be a rational
one, reasons must be adduced as to why one proffered decision is to prevail
over another. Such reasons will obviously be based on the canon law by
which the disputants have agreed to bind themselves, but they must also
represent a preference for one view of that law over another.
Id. at 726-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice Rehnquist approved of
the Illinois courts' approach, which the majority rejected, making such a rational
decision, "on the basis of testimony from experts on the canon law at issue, that the
decision of the religious tribunal involved was rendered in violation of its own stated
rules of procedure." Id. at 727. For an analysis of Justice Rehnquist's dissent, see
Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1859-63.
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Likewise, the language of dissenting opinions in free exercise cases suggests some
dissatisfaction with an important aspect of the Court's hands-off approach: the refusal
to consider the centrality of a religious practice or belief. Dissenting in Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery, Justice Brennan,joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, wrote
that:
I believe it appropriate, therefore, to require some showing of "central-
ity" before the Government can be required either to come forward with a
compelling justification for its proposed use of federal land or to forgo that
use altogether. "Centrality," however, should not be equated with the sur-
vival or extinction of the religion itself .... [A]dherents challenging a pro-
posed use of federal land should be required to show that the decision poses
a substantial and realistic threat of frustrating their religious practices.
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 474-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To be sure, Justice Brennan
rejected and responded to the majority's criticism that his view would "place courts in
the untenable position of deciding which practices and beliefs are 'central' to a given
faith and which are not, and invites the prospect of judges advising some religious
adherents that they 'misunderstand their own religious beliefs.'" Id. at 475 (quoting
id. at 457-58 (majority opinion)). Nevertheless, both the language and the logic of
Justice Brennan's position differ significantly from the majority's hands-off approach.
Similarly, in an extended footnote to his groundbreaking and controversial
majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), Justice Scalia
characterized the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall and Blackmun, and the dissenting opinion ofJustice Blackmun,joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, as requiring a consideration of the centrality of a
religious practice or belief:
While arguing that we should apply the compelling interest test in this
case, JUSTICE O'CONNOR nonetheless agrees that "our determination of the
constitutionality of Oregon's general criminal prohibition cannot, and
should not, turn on the centrality of the particular religious practice at
issue." This means, presumably, that compelling-interest scrutiny must be
applied to generally applicable laws that regulate or prohibit any religiously
motivated activity, no matter how unimportant to the claimant's religion.
Earlier in her opinion, however, JUSTICE O'CONNOR appears to contradict
this, saying that the proper approach is "to determine whether the burden
on the specific plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant and whether
the particular criminal interest asserted by the State before us is compel-
ling." "Constitutionally significant burden" would seem to be "centrality"
under another name. In any case, dispensing with a "centrality" inquiry is
utterly unworkable. It would require, for example, the same degree of "com-
pelling state interest" to impede the practice of throwing rice at church wed-
dings as to impede the practice of getting married in church. There is no
way out of the difficulty that, if general laws are to be subjected to a "relig-
ious practice" exception, both the importance of the law at issue and the
centrality of the practice at issue must reasonably be considered.
Nor is this difficulty avoided by JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S assertion that
"although... courts should refrain from delving into questions whether, as a
matter of religious doctrine, a particular practice is 'central' to the relig-
ion, .. . I do not think this means that the courts must turn a blind eye to the
severe impact of a State's restrictions on the adherents of a minority relig-
2009 ]
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doctrine has undergone considerable modification and extension. 17
ion." As JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion proceeds to make clear, inquiry into
.severe impact" is no different from inquiry into centrality. He has merely
substituted for the question "How important is X to the religious adherent?"
the question "How great will be the harm to the religious adherent if X is
taken away?" There is no material difference.
Id. at 887-88 n.4 (citations omitted).
Moreover, notwithstanding the hands-off approach, some Justices appear to have
been more willing to examine the substance of religious doctrine in Establishment
Clause cases. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989),Justice Blackmun's
opinion carefully considered the religious nature of a creche and a menorah, in
apparent violation of a hands-off approach. See id. at 578-622. Indeed, Justice Ken-
nedy criticized Justice Blackmun for "assum[ing] the difficult and inappropriate task
of saying what every religious symbol means." Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Expressing one of the most common justifications for
the Court's broad hands-off approach, Justice Kennedy sharply declared that "[t]his
Court is ill equipped to sit as a national theology board, and I question both the
wisdom and the constitutionality of its doing so." Id.
In a concurring opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), Justice Souter
seemed to find Chief Justice Rehnquist's Establishment Clause jurisprudence incon-
sistent with the Court's hands-off approach. Joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, Justice Souter rejected a "nonpreferentialist" interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause, which he ascribed to ChiefJustice Rehnquist. Id. at 616 n.3 (Souter,
J., concurring). Among the grounds he offered for rejecting the nonpreferentialist
view, Justice Souter argued that:
In many contexts, including this one, nonpreferentialism requires some dis-
tinction between "sectarian" religious practices and those that would be, by
some measure, ecumenical enough to pass Establishment Clause muster.
Simply by requiring the enquiry, nonpreferentialists invite the courts to
engage in comparative theology. I can hardly imagine a subject less amena-
ble to the competence of the federal judiciary, or more deliberately to be
avoided where possible.
Id. at 616-17.
Strikingly, in a more recent Establishment Clause case, Justice Souter appears to
have strayed from the Court's hands-off approach as well, in a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See Kevin Pybas, Does the Establish-
ment Clause Require Religion to Be Confined to the Private Sphere , 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 71,
101-02 (2005) (analyzing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002)
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
17 See generally Goldstein, supra note 12, at 502-25 (discussing the "evolution of
the prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions" and noting that "the
scope of the prohibition has increased exponentially in recent years"); Levine, supra
note 12 (describing the expansion of the Court's refusal to assess religious questions).
For example, as I have noted elsewhere, the Court's holding in Thomas v. Review
Board, 450 U.S. at 707, extended the hands-off approach in a manner arguably incon-
sistent with the Court's position in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). SeeLevine,
supra note 12, at 92-101.
However, contrary to an inference apparently drawn by Professor Koppelman, I
did not argue, as a normative matter, that "in order to be religious, a claim must
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Additionally, there remain areas of church-state law in which courts
may not always be able to avoid the types ofjudgments that the hands-
off approach seems to preclude."' Nevertheless, just as Smith and
'represent[ ] the view of an organized group.'" See Andrew Koppelman, The Trouble-
some Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 865, 867 n.13 (2009)
(quoting Levine, supra note 12, at 110). Rather, on a descriptive level, I observed the
Court's analysis in Thomas, which granted free exercise protection to an individualis-
tic interpretation of a religious belief system, may be inconsistent with the majority
opinion in Yoder, in which Chief Justice Burger found the Amish lifestyle religious in
nature, under the Religion Clauses, in part because it was "shared by an organized
group." See Levine, supra note 12, at 110-11 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16).
Likewise, as a descriptive matter rather than as a prescriptive claim, I observed
that the Court's hands-off approach contributed to the Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, which broadly curtailed the contours of free exercise
protections. See Levine, supra note 12, at 87, 115-22 (outlining the Court's reticence
in assessing religious doctrine); see also Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1906 ("If one
reads Employment Division v. Smith with any care, one notices that ... the major basis
for the decision is that courts should not have to assess religious understandings and
the strength of religious feeling in order to decide if a religious claim is strong
enough to warrant an exemption.").
18 For example, in a number of areas of free exercise claims, courts will have to
determine whether the government has placed a "substantial burden" on a person's
exercise of religion. This standard has been incorporated into both RFRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1 (2000), and RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (a) (1) (2000). One plausible
interpretation of the term "substantial burden" would likely require courts to
examine carefully the substance of a claimant's religious beliefs, for the purpose of
determining the degree of burden that the government has imposed on the claim-
ant's exercise of religion.
Thus, in a recent en banc Ninth Circuit case, three dissenting judges disputed
the majority's application of RFRA, in part because, according to the dissenters, the
majority opinion was premised upon a "[m]isunderstand[ing of] the nature of relig-
ious belief and practice." Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2008) (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Indeed, several pages of the dissenting opinion
are dedicated to a detailed description of the precise nature of the plaintiffs' religious
beliefs, including the extensively documented findings that "Hopi religious beliefs
and practices center on the San Francisco Peaks"; "[t]he Peaks are also of fundamen-
tal importance to the religious beliefs and practices of the Navajo"; "[t]he Peaks fig-
ure centrally in the beliefs of the Hualapai. The Peaks are similarly central to the
beliefs of the Havasupai .... Id. at 1099-1102.
The dissent's insistence on careful consideration of the centrality of a religious
claim to an adherent's religious practices and beliefs squarely contradicts a primary
element of the Supreme Court's hands-off approach. Indeed, in Lyng, a case that in
many ways serves as an analogue to Navajo Nation, the majority expressly rejected a
similar argument propounded by dissenting Supreme Court Justices:
We would accordingly be required to weigh the value of every religious
belief and practice that is said to be threatened by any government pro-
gram .... [This offers] us the prospect of this Court's holding that some
sincerely held religious beliefs and practices are not "central" to certain reli-
gions, despite protestations to the contrary from the religious objectors who
2009 ]
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Lemon continue to depict the general contours of the Court's
approach to Free Exercise and Establishment Clause law, respectively,
the hands-off approach accurately describes the Court's general atti-
tude toward resolving questions of religious doctrine. 19
Therefore, rather than addressing the substantive nature of the
Court's hands-off doctrine, the contributors to this Symposium focus
on the normative and practical justifications for the Court's approach.
As Professor Richard Garnett observes in his Symposium essay, 20
brought the lawsuit. In other words, the dissent's approach would require us
to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own religious
beliefs. We think such an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution
or with our precedents, and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that we
were never intended to play.
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457-58.
Likewise, in Smith, the majority cited numerous Supreme Court precedents in
support of the Court's rejection of a centrality analysis in free exercise cases, charac-
terizing such an analysis as violating the Court's broader hands-off approach:
Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents' proposal by requir-
ing a "compelling state interest" only when the conduct prohibited is "cen-
tral" to the individual's religion. It is no more appropriate for judges to
determine the "centrality" of religious beliefs before applying a "compelling
interest" test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to deter-
mine the "importance" of ideas before applying the "compelling interest"
test in the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought
to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is "central" to
his personal faith? Judging the centrality of different religious practices is
akin to the unacceptable "business of evaluating the relative merits of differ-
ing religious claims." As we reaffirmed only last Term, "[i]t is not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds."
Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must
not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the
plausibility of a religious claim.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (citations omitted). In support of this approach, the major-
ity cited such cases as: Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Lyng, 485
U.S. at 474-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
602-06 (1979); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450; Ballard, 322 U.S. at 85-87.
For examples of other areas in which courts may not be able to avoid adjudicat-
ing the substance of religious doctrine, see Goldstein, supra note 12, at 525-33.
19 See Garnett, supra note 12, at 1659 ("[T]he 'no religious decision' principle is,
and almost certainly will remain, at the heart of our Religion Clause doctrine.").
20 See Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We
Talking About?, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 837 (2009).
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descriptively, the hands-off rule is clear: "state actors should not
render religious decisions-decisions involving the resolution of relig-
ious questions or the enforcement of religious obligations; we should
not, the rule would suggest, use secular law to assure observance of
practices with religious significance."2 1
The question that arises, Garnett explains, is then a deceptively
simple one: "[b] ut, why not?" 22 In an effort to respond to this ques-
tion, Garnett engages in a thoughtful and admittedly provocative anal-
ysis of various justifications that have been offered for the hands-off
approach:
I want to suggest that some of the justifications often invoked for
the rule are not entirely satisfactory and that, accordingly, allowing
such justifications to shape the rule and its applications could also
be "misguided." In perhaps an even riskier move, I will also suggest
that, notwithstanding the "complexity of [the relevant] considera-
tions," one particular justification for the hands-off rule should have
primacy of place. 23
Specifically, Garnett insists that, "It is not that religious questions
are hard, weird, or irrelevant."24 Instead, building on his earlier
work,2 5 Garnett favors "the most ancient rationale of all" for the
hands-off approach, "namely, that secular authorities lack the power to
answer some questions-religious questions-whose resolution is,
under an appropriately pluralistic political theory, left to other institu-
tions." 26 According to Garnett, "[t]his rationale . . . is not only the
strongest; it also pulls the hands-off rule from the margins of First
Amendment esoterica to the very heart of religious freedom and
church-state separation, properly understood." 27
In his illuminating contribution to the Symposium, Professor
Andrew Koppelman likewise aims to answer the basic question of "why
it is regarded as appropriate for government to keep its hands off
religious doctrine."28 Koppelman responds through the ambitious
framework of a broader defense of the hands-off doctrine against
21 Id. at 854-55 (footnote omitted).
22 Id. at 855.
23 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law:
Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L.
REv. 781, 843 (1998)).
24 Id. at 861.
25 Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and
the Church-State Nexus, 22J.L. & RELIGION 503, 512 (2007).
26 Garnett, supra note 20, at 861.
27 Id. at 861-62.
28 Koppelman, supra note 17 at 867.
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objections it has faced from commentators on a variety of conceptual
grounds.29 After citing a number of "familiar considerations" support-
ing "[g]overnment neutrality toward religion," Koppelman cites "one
consideration that is often overlooked: the idea that religion can be
damaged and degraded by state involvement with it. ' '30
Significantly, as Koppelman emphasizes, his position is "friendly
to religion but, precisely for that reason, is determined to keep the
state away from religion. It is associated with the most prominent
early proponents of toleration and disestablishment. ' ' 3 1 In short, he
explains, "the corruption argument depends on a claim that religion
is, in some way, a good thing. '3 2 Therefore, he concludes, "[t]he
hands-off rule ... is an application of the corruption rationale. The
state is to keep its hands off religion precisely for the sake of religion,
because religion will be damaged by contact with the state."33 In the
process of elucidating this position, Koppelman defends the hands-off
approach against objections directed at the "coherence of its intellec-
tual underpinnings." 34
Like Koppelman, Provost Christopher Eisgruber and Dean Law-
rence Sager frame their Symposium essay as a response to objections
to the Supreme Court's hands-off approach. 35 However, unlike Kop-
pelman, they understand the purpose of the religion clauses as "not to
protect religion per se, but to protect Americans from a certain kind
of governmental malfeasance that proceeds against the backdrop of a
religious and religiously diverse society."36 In their view:
[T]he point of the Religion Clauses is not to affirm (or deny) the
value of religious practices, any more than the point of the Free
Speech Clause is to affirm (or deny) the value of flag burning. The
point of the Religion Clauses is instead to prohibit the government
from showing the kinds of favoritism historically associated with
religious persecution, and any doctrine that would involve courts in
affirming (or denying) the value of religious practice would com-
promise rather than advance that purpose.3 7
29 See id. at 866-67.
30 Id. at 867.
31 Id. at 868.
32 Id.; see also Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006
U. ILL. L. REv. 571, 571 ("Because religion is a distinctive human good, accommoda-
tion of religion as such is not unfair.").
33 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 883.
34 Id. at 886.
35 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion
Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807 (2009).
36 Id. at 811.
37 Id. at 834-35.
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Thus, relying on their groundbreaking book on religious lib-
erty,38 and employing what they characterize as a "shamelessly provoc-
ative title," 39 Eisgruber and Sager ask plainly, "does it matter what
religion is?"40 To be sure, they limit the scope of their question,
declaring, " [w] e have no doubt that it does matter... what religion is"
for a variety of cultural, ethical, and sociological purposes, as well as to
inform historical, philosophical, and legal conversations about relig-
ious freedom. 41 However, they reason that "it does not follow ... that
a robust and attractive regime of religious liberty has to make close
and controversial judgments that qualify some activities as religious
and disqualify others."42 In fact, they conclude that 'just where com-
peting theories about the definition of religion become controversial
and interesting, they also become irrelevant to constitutional law."'43
Professor Bernadette Meyler's essay brings an international and
comparative component to the Symposium, in addition to a more
practical focus, reexamining the United States Supreme Court's
hands-off approach through the contrast case of the European atti-
tude toward commercial activities of religious organizations. 4 4
Returning to the origins of the Supreme Court's approach, Meyler
observes that the Court's 1944 holding in United States v. Ballard4 5
included the "surprising conclusion that, although a decision on truth
or falsity might be impermissible, a jury could evaluate the sincerity of
the religious adherent's belief in the propositions he or she had
presented. ' 46 Meyler suggests that the Court "thus treated the relig-
ious beliefs in question as a kind of black box, attempting to circum-
navigate them by resorting to an assessment of whether the
defendants' beliefs were or were not sincerely held. '4 7 Consistent
with this hands-off approach, "the Court will intervene in the assess-
ment of whether fraud has occurred in the religious sphere only
under a very specific and narrow range of circumstances." 48 Accord-
ingly, she notes, "[w]ithin U.S. constitutional jurispru-
dence . . . religion has been granted substantial latitude to pursue
38 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2.
39 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 35, at 833.
40 Id. at 834.
41 Id. at 808.
42 Id. at 809.
43 Id.
44 Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 887 (2009).
45 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
46 Meyler, supra note 44, at 892.
47 Id. at 893.
48 Id. at 899.
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paths that, if engaged in by nonreligious entities, would be considered
commercial, without itself being given that label. 49
Turning to the European Court of Human Rights, Meyler finds
that the ECHR "has been much more willing than the U.S. Supreme
Court to disaggregate speech from religion, to accept the characteri-
zation of proselytism involving financial incentives as a form of com-
mercial speech and, as a consequence, to grant it lesser consideration
than other kinds of religion or speech." 50 Indeed, "[w]hereas under
the U.S. model religion and commerce can coexist, under the Euro-
pean paradigm, once an activity or entity is deemed commercial, it
fails to be considered religious at all. ' 51 Finally, Meyler observes that
in further contrast to the United States Supreme Court's hands-off
approach in Ballard, the European Commission of Human Rights
"viewed the state as acting within the legitimate bounds of its authority
in policing the dissemination of religious assertions.... [The Com-
mission thus indicated] a willingness to view religious consumers as
even more in need of protection than secular ones, who might pre-
sumably operate according to more of a nationalist instrumentalist
logic." 52
Taken together, the essays in this Symposium demonstrate wide
areas of disagreement among scholars as to both the conceptual
underpinnings and the normative and policy justifications for the
Supreme Court's hands-off approach to questions of religious practice
and belief. In addition, there appears to be a correlation between
scholars' views toward the hands-off approach and their broader atti-
tudes toward the function of religion and the Religion Clauses in the
context of American society. To the extent that the Court likewise
premises its hands-off approach upon a more general Religion Clause
jurisprudence, it remains to be seen whether, along with changes in
other areas of Religion Clause doctrine, the Supreme Court might
rethink both the conceptual and substantive components of the
hands-off approach.53
49 Id.
50 Id. at 896.
51 Id. at 908.
52 Id. at 910.
53 As Professor Kent Greenawalt observed in 1998, with respect to one area of the
Supreme Court's hands-off approach, the church property cases that the Court
decided in 1976 and 1979:
Since [those decisions], some basic principles of free exercise and establish-
mentjurisprudence have undergone radical transformation. If the Justices
decide that the principles governing church property cases inadequately
serve the values of free exercise and nonestablishment, we should not sup-
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pose that they will cling tenaciously to what was said twenty years ago. The
truism that language of prior Court opinions is never set in stone seems
especially apt for [church property cases].
Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1863. Greenawalt's salient observation may apply more
generally to other aspects of the Court's hands-off approach as well.
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